CCHA, Historical Studies, 65 (1999), 28-49
Archbishop E.P. Roche, J.R. Smallwood,
and Denominational Rights in
in Newfoundland Education, 1948
John Edward FitzGerald
The
eleventh of December 1998 was the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of
Newfoundland’s Terms of Union with Canada by representatives of the governments
of Canada and Newfoundland. The terms brought Newfoundland into confederation,
and came into force “just before the expiration of 31 March 1949.” A
constitutional document, they established a legal, political, and social
relationship between what had hitherto been two countries, and expressed the
kind of society and state Newfoundlanders desired for themselves. In the late
1940s, a good deal of political significance was attached in public debate by
the leading advocate of confederation, Joseph R. Smallwood, to the views of the
hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church on the issues of confederation and
education. The archbishop, Edward P. Roche, was a known anti-confederate, and
he held fast to the importance of denominational education. In the late
twentieth century, the most contentious term has been Term 17, the education
clause, which guaranteed religious denominations the right to state funding for
their schools, and rights to control school administration, the religious
studies curriculum, and the hiring and firing of teachers. In September 1998,
the Newfoundland government implemented a replacement to the denominational
system of education. Roman Catholic parents and bishops opposed this move in
the courts, claiming that it violated their guaranteed educational and minority
rights. It is therefore timely to examine how the issue of denominational
education was a factor in the confederation debates of the late 1940s, why
constitutional guarantees were given to the Newfoundland religious denominations,
and to examine the extent of Archbishop Roche’s involvement in the
confederation and education questions.
In 1836, the education act passed
by the Newfoundland legislature established a school board for each of the nine
electoral districts of Newfoundland. It allocated a grant for education,
earmarking £300 for Church of England schools and £300 for Roman Catholic
schools.1 This act established several
important precedents for Newfoundland. It established a formally
non-denominational education system, patterned after the formally
non-denominational but informally Protestant Irish national system instituted
in Ireland in 1831.2
More importantly, the legitimacy of denominational schools was recognized by
providing partial but regular subventions towards their operations, where
funding had been hitherto provided by the denominations and by occasional
government grants.3 Denominations were thus assisted in creating a
cradle-to-grave social environment in which to preserve their cultures and
beliefs. For Irish-Newfoundland Roman Catholics between 1836 and 1949, this
meant baptism in the Church, education in a Catholic school system and possibly
in a Catholic college or a Catholic teacher training program, and by the mid-1920s,
with the approval of Archbishop Roche, Catholic college affiliation with
inter-denominational Memorial University College. The system was seen by the
Irish as facilitating equal Irish participation in the political life of the
Newfoundland state. In 1855, Britain granted Newfoundland responsible
government with a parliament. P.F. Little, a Catholic lawyer, became the first
Premier. In the election of 1869, Newfoundlanders rejected confederation with
Canada. Irish Catholics spearheaded the anti-confederate movement, and equated
union with the British North American provinces to the west with the Act of
Union and a loss of sovereignty.
Only in
the early twentieth century, when it looked as if confederation with Canada
might at last take place, did Roman Catholic leaders begin to fear that
confederation might challenge the “denominational principle” of education,
specifically, the Church’s customary legal right to state funding for its
schools. Edward Patrick Roche was the second archbishop of Newfoundland and the
youngest Roman Catholic archbishop in the British Empire when he took
possession of the See of St. John’s in 1914. In 1905, as parish priest at
Powerscourt, Manuels, Conception Bay, Roche had been appointed secretary of the
Archdiocesan Education Committee, and directed by Archbishop Howley to gather
information on Catholic education with which to answer challenges to the
“denomination principle” which might be placed before the government.4
In October 1915, as archbishop, Roche founded a new Catholic Education Council
to defend denominational education. And in 1916, in his first address to the
priests of his diocese, Roche equated the possibility of confederation with a
threat to denominational education, and stated his perception of the Church’s
and his responsibility to protect it:
The
preservation of our denominational system of education rests entirely with
ourselves.
Of
recent years there have been rumours, persistent rumours ... of Confederation
with Canada. Of the truth or otherwise of these rumours I know no more than the
man in the street ... I have no doubt, however, that if ever such a question
should arise the people will get an opportunity of passing upon it. It will
then be our duty as citizens, as Newfoundlanders, as lovers of our country, to
examine every phase of the question minutely ... it is not beyond the bounds of
possibility that it may be incumbent upon us to tender our advice to the
Catholic people ... should the issue ever become a real and vital one unless
our educational terms are acceded to, no matter how attractive the other
aspects of the question may be, we will be forced to give it our most
pronounced and uncompromising opposition.5
Confederation,
therefore, would be acceptable to Catholics only if Catholic educational terms
were accepted and Catholic schools were funded by the state. Throughout his
episcopacy Roche consistently opposed confederation on these grounds. It was a
position from which he never retreated, and on which he was rarely challenged.
Along with the rest of the countries of the
western world in the 1930s, Newfoundland faced the onslaught of the Depression.
By early 1932, the costs of building a trans-insular railway in the 1880s and
90s, and the costs of participating in World War I imperilled the country’s
ability to meet the interest payments on its $100 million debt. Bankruptcy
threatened, political corruption
flourished and welfare rolls swelled. After a riot at the legislature and the
election of a new government, a royal commission of inquiry recommended that
Newfoundland voluntarily suspend self-government until the country was
self-supporting again, when self-government would be restored at the request of
the people. Britain would assume the government of the island with an appointed
Commission of Government composed of a British governor, three British
commissioners, and three Newfoundland commissioners. The legislature approved
these recommendations, and for reasons not unlike those which motivated Irish
parliamentarians in 1800, it voted itself out of existence in late 1933. The
Commission of Government took over on 16 February 1934. One of its first policy
manouevres was an attempt to dismantle denominational education, but the plan
ran headlong into Roman Catholic and Anglican opposition, particularly from
Roche, and it quickly died.6
The
outbreak of war in 1939 changed the world forever, and changed Newfoundland
into an armed American and Canadian camp. The island’s economy began to boom,
fulfilling the first condition for the return of self-government. By 1943, the
British Secretary of State Clement Attlee was determined that Newfoundland’s
constitutional status should be reviewed. He visited St. John’s and called on
Roche, who informed him of his views on the need to preserve Catholic
education. As the 1940s wore on, there were growing demands made by
Newfoundland unions, businessmen, and political groups for Britain to return
self-government. In July 1945, Attlee formed a Labour government. In December
of that year he surprised many Newfoundlanders when, instead of announcing the
end of Commission of Government and the immediate return of responsible
government, he announced that a Newfoundland National Convention would be
elected with a mandate to recommend options to the British government to be
placed before the Newfoundland people on a ballot in a constitutional
referendum. The Convention was elected in June 1946.
In the summer of 1946, Roche made a
statement on confederation and education to the priests of the archdiocese,
gathered in their annual retreat. He observed that while the Commission of
Government at present exhibited an “intelligent appreciation of the Education
situation in Newfoundland,” that
If
... the people of this country should decide to become a province of Canada – I
hope that contingency will never arise, because it would become an ill-advised
and unfortunate decision – immediately the education issue would become a live
issue. It is true that in theory in Canada each Province decides its own
educational policy, but it had to provide the funds. Newfoundland’s economy
being what it is, we could never from direct taxation provide the necessary
grants, and education would at once become a Federal question with results and
consequences that anyone would foresee.7
Dependence
on Ottawa for transfer payments to fund education was unacceptable, for it
could impinge on the Church’s ability to control education. “Informed public
opinion among our Catholic people” was needed, so the attentions of the
diocesan Catholic newspaper, The Monitor (whose editorial content was
vetted by Roche’s solicitor, R.S. Furlong) were pledged to this mission.8
As
prominent as Roche was in St. John’s, he did not directly represent the views
of the whole Church in Newfoundland. The Catholic clergy throughout the island
were divided over confederation, as were their congregations. In the
predominantly rural Diocese of St. George’s, stretching along the west coast of
the island, people of Acadian, Scots, Irish, English and Mi‘kmaq heritage
favoured confederation, as did their bishop, Michael O’Reilly.9
On the east coast, the people of the Diocese of Harbour Grace were
predominantly Irish Catholics who strongly opposed confederation, as did their
bishop, John O’Neill.10 As
suffragan bishops, O’Reilly and O’Neill deferred to Roche in matters of faith
and morals, and tried to present a unified appearance. By the mid-1940s,
Archbishop Roche had become infirm, so in the spring of 1945 the priest Thomas
Flynn, the pastor of St. Patrick’s parish in St. John’s and founder of The
Monitor, was appointed co-adjutor archbishop. The Canadian High Commission
in St. John’s, J. Scott Macdonald, reported to Ottawa that Flynn also favoured
confederation.11 But Flynn did not
represent Roche’s views or those of the vast majority of St. John’s Roman
Catholics.
When the National Convention met in
September 1946, its proceedings were broadcast on radio across Newfoundland.
Debate was dominated by Joseph R. Smallwood, a former socialist, communist,
union organizer, broadcaster, and pig-farmer, and the only Convention member
elected on a platform of seeking confederation with Canada. One of the
microphones used to broadcast the proceedings was placed in the chamber before
him, and he fully exploited this opportunity to spread “the Gospel of
Confederation.” In May 1947 in the Convention, Gordon Higgins read from an
address delivered by Archbishop Roche recommending the expansion of Memorial
University College into a fully-fledged Newfoundland university, in order that
a native educational institution might “embrace within its scope and ambit
those institutions in our midst which have their roots deep in the soil and the
traditions of the country.”12 On other
occasions, members spoke about making adjustments to the Newfoundland school
curriculum, but not to the denominational system of education.13
As the
deliberations of the Convention proceeded through late 1946 and into 1947, the
opinions of the members gradually polarized for and against confederation.
Debate was often acrimonious. Outside the Convention, a Responsible Government
League (RGL) was formed to lobby for the return of self-government. On 26
February 1947 the Convention proposed to send a delegation to London, to
determine the extent of future financial assistance Britain was prepared to
give Newfoundland, and one to Ottawa, to seek Canadian terms of union. The
London delegation was received cooly and it secured no British commitment of
future financial aid if the Convention failed to recommend the inclusion of Commission
of Government on the referendum ballot.14
The Ottawa delegation, consisting of Smallwood, Gordon Higgins, F. Gordon
Bradley, and others, was warmly received. Smallwood wrote Canadian Secretary of
State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent, pressing him to offer generous
terms,15 and Canadian civil
servants were prepared for the Newfoundlanders’ arrival.
Little had been said in the Convention
about denominational education, but Ottawa mandarins had already struggled with
the political imperative that a successful confederation campaign in
Newfoundland would require that the churches, particularly the Roman Catholic
Church, be guaranteed that their educational rights would be protected under
confederation. In early May 1947, R.A. MacKay wrote his colleague Paul Bridle
of the Department of External Affairs that it was his “offhand opinion” that
“since the Newfoundland system of multi-denominationalism rests largely on law
rather than custom, Sec. 93 would rivet the system indefinitely on Newfoundland
in the event of union, unless precautions were taken in the act of union to
avoid this.”16 MacKay, the principal
advisor in External Affairs on the Newfoundland question, was uncomfortable with
the Newfoundland denominational education system and feared that any guarantees
given on education in section 93 of the British North America Act, or its
possible successor, the Newfoundland-Canada terms of union, would be permanent.
But this
was precisely what Smallwood wanted. His difficulty was that no member of the
Ottawa delegation had consulted Roche for his views on education before going
to Ottawa. Smallwood later wrote that Roche “was implacably determined to see
that the terms and conditions of Newfoundland’s union with Canada would contain
absolute protection of the existing rights of the churches to public funds for
the operation of their schools” and that “I vowed that the status quo should be
maintained in the most unalterable way that could be found and that this should
be covered within the actual terms of union.”17
Smallwood maintained that he was disgusted to discover that Gordon Higgins, the
“prominent and respected” Catholic member of the delegation and the president
of the influential Benevolent Irish Society, had not called on Roche to secure
his views on education before leaving Newfoundland.18
In order to overcome Higgins’s shortcomings,
to do an end-run around Roche’s opposition, and get assurances from Canadian
Catholic hierarchs that confederation would not harm Newfoundland Catholic
education, Smallwood arranged for Bradley to meet the Apostolic Delegate to
Canada, Archbishop Ildebrando Antonutti, and seek his opinion.19
Bradley, a former Grand Master of the Orange Lodge of Newfoundland, was
squeamish about the meeting. But apparently unaware of (or unconcerned about)
Roche’s desire to see the status quo maintained, Antonutti warmly
welcomed Bradley and told him that while divorce would not be a problem (even
though it was in Newfoundland, because the Church had always opposed divorce
legislation), the Church’s principal concern was with the financing of Catholic
schools.20 Smallwood later claimed
that Antonutti also told Bradley that “our Church wouldn’t want anything by way
of rights, school rights, in Newfoundland more than the Protestant schools get
in Quebec.”21 Bradley emerged from the
meeting delighted and told Smallwood that Antonutti, “though a Roman Catholic
and an Italian at that,” had completely placed him at ease.22
Roche’s input had been circumvented, and he could now be set up as a straw man
by Smallwood.
During
the delegation’s meetings in Ottawa in early July, the Canadians assured the
Newfoundlanders that provincial jurisdiction was complete over education, and
that the BNA Act gave the federal government certain powers of safeguarding
separate school education. But there would no difficulty, in the event of
union, for Newfoundland to insert into its terms “such provisions as they
wished to adopt regarding their educational system and the federal government
would not be disposed to intervene subsequently in contravention of the wishes of Newfoundland.”23
Five days later the Canadians reiterated this assurance.24
At a meeting on 11 August, the Canadians explained to the Newfoundland
delegation that Section 93 of the BNA Act would “perpetuate the present
denominational system of education in Newfoundland and prevent the provincial
legislature from altering it,” a provision which the Newfoundland Roman
Catholic Church wanted but which the United (the former Methodist) Church did
not, for it could possibly prevent them from amalgamating their schools with
those of other Protestant denominations. Hence, Newfoundland would need its own
education clause, and it was made clear to the Newfoundland delegation that it
would have to make specific proposals.25
The Convention’s decision to send a
delegation to Canada, and the long time the delegation spent there, upset
advocates of responsible government that “underhanded methods” were being used
to promote confederation. During the summer of 1947, the RGL president, F.M.
O’Leary, encouraged Archbishop Roche to comment on confederation.26
On 20 July 1947, Archbishop Flynn read an address by Roche to a reunion of the
Old Boys’ Alumni Club of St. Bonaventure’s College, a Catholic school adjacent
to the cathedral in St. John’s. Roche asserted that because the youth of
Newfoundland had grown up in an “undemocratic atmosphere” since 1933, they should
awaken from their apathy in order to avert a “national disaster.” They were
“the trustees for posterity in a sense that no previous generation could claim
to be,” and he warned that “the fate of Newfoundland will be irrevocably
determined for weal or woe in the very near future.”27
The July-August issue of The Monitor observed that “It would surely be
the supreme tragedy of our history, if by apathy, indifference, lack of
enlightened leadership, or the influence of sinister propaganda we were to
alienate irretrievably the inheritance which was won for us by our patriotic
forbears, which is a sacred heritage from the past.”28
Before
the Ottawa delegation returned to Newfoundland in early October, Bradley and
Smallwood drafted an education term which was circulated to the Canadian
cabinet. Prime Minister Mackenzie King noted in his papers that Louis St.
Laurent had intimated to the Newfoundlanders that the education term was
primarily a matter of concern to Newfoundland rather than to Canada and “that
the clause on Education should be drafted by them.” The clause was designed
“(a) to protect existing denominational rights, and, (b) to permit of voluntary
amalgamation of denominational schools which is a matter of concern to certain
Protestant denominations.”29 But
Canadian officials were concerned that it might not be apparent “why a clause
of this nature was inserted” into the terms of union, possibly “leaving the
impression that this was what the federal government wished.”30 Therefore, on the return train trip to
Newfoundland through Eastern Canada, Smallwood, Higgins, and MacKay discussed
an alternative draft, the purpose of which was “to make it clear that the
federal government will fall in line with the suggestions of the provincial
government,” but this draft did not survive.31
Later that fall at a press conference, St. Laurent reiterated that education
had been under the unrestricted control of Newfoundland and maintained that the
federal government had drafted the proposals to give effect to the
Newfoundlanders’ wishes.32
It was one thing to draft a term on
education, but quite another for the religious denominations to approve it. For
Smallwood, this would be a political necessity. Shortly after the Ottawa
delegation returned to St. John’s, Smallwood informed Scott Macdonald that he
had discussed the draft clause with the leaders of the Church of England, the
United Church Conference, and the Salvation Army, but that none of these had
any objection to the wording of the clause.33
Higgins undertook to bring the draft clause on
education to Roche. Macdonald reported to Ottawa that Higgins “called at the
Palace and in the absence of the Archbishop, left copies of the two texts with
Father O’Mara, the Archbishop’s private secretary and the Administrator of the
Archdiocese. Archbishop Roche has since returned to the city but Mr. Higgins
has not yet had any further contact with him.”34
Macdonald also reported that he learned “from an unimpeachable source” that
while Roche had taken no public stand on the constitutional question, in
private he held “rather strong views” in favour of a return to responsible
government.35
In October, Prime Minister Mackenzie King
sent the Proposed Terms of Union to the governor of Newfoundland who forwarded
them to the Convention. In debate, Smallwood spoke on each of the 23 clauses,
and emphasized the strength of the proposed clause 19: “If any denomination
wishes to go on forever with its own system of schools, their right is
guaranteed in clause 19.”36
Nevertheless, this was only a proposed term, which was not final, and was
subject to change by Canada upon receipt of a modifying request of the National
Convention. Smallwood told the people of Newfoundland through the Convention
that Ottawa,
Knowing
as they do ... what our school system is, they were most anxious to protect our
rights as they stand today. So they put in a clause to do that. It does exactly
that. ... [They] would be prepared to give reasonable consideration to
suggestions for modification or addition ... They are open to make it even more
binding than it is for the purpose of guaranteeing and protecting the rights of
the various classes of persons in Newfoundland.37
This
was the purpose of clause 19. When asked by Convention member Peter Cashin, a
leading anti-confederate and Roman Catholic, whether clause 19 was necessary in
view of the fact that section 93 of the BNA Act covered education, Smallwood
replied that
I
am afraid section 93 does not cover the points in the clause in our terms.
There are two points that seemed and seem to be highly desirable in this
country today. One point is this: any denomination that has its own schools
must be guaranteed the right to have their schools as long as ever they want
them to be so; all the rights they have now must be guaranteed to last forever
– to have separate denominational schools and to have them paid for out of the
public chest. ... On the other hand, if any two denominations who want to unite
their two systems of schools ... the right to do that is also in these terms,
so that all rights are protected. ... the Government of Canada does not want to
interfere in the matter. We all appreciate why that is. It is a delicate matter,
and the government does not want to interfere or meddle where our conscience is
at stake. They want to protect the rights we have without changing them one
iota.38
In
reply to Convention member Ike Newell, Smallwood observed that while the
Newfoundland delegation was in Ottawa, “The last thing we wanted or would
welcome would be to run counter to the beliefs or faiths of the people of
Newfoundland.”39 Convention member Gordon
Higgins asked whether a Newfoundland government after confederation could
subsequently change the education clause. Smallwood replied that if
Newfoundlanders voted for confederation in the referendum, “the government
elected after[wards] might not have the authority to change that clause. The
time to change it, if it is to be changed, is before the referendum is held.”40
By December 1947, Roche had still given no
reply on the education term. Smallwood later wrote bitterly that Higgins was
not received by Roche, and that “we never did get any authoritative report of
his feelings about the draft terms themselves.”41
But Roche was highly offended at the notion that any body or delegation other
than a responsible government of Newfoundland could legitimately seek terms of
union from Canada,42 and most
likely he refused to dignify such an ad-hoc process with a reply. Smallwood and
the confederates remained anxious about the education term. In mid-December the
Convention officially sent a copy of the terms including the education clause
to the archbishop,43 but
again Roche did not reply. At this point, the proposed guarantees for education
under confederation appeared to have no effect on the Church’s position on
confederation, which under Roche had always been to preserve Catholic rights in
education, and to see responsible government returned before negotiations for
union were undertaken. However, this position obviously affected the lengths to
which Smallwood went to try to satisfy Roman Catholics and other denominations
on the education question.
In
November 1947, the Church made its first public statement on the confederation
issue in The Monitor. In an article entitled “Newfoundland at the
Parting of the Ways,” Catholics were exhorted to “consider what is best for the
country” and recognize that “there has grown up with us during the past four
and a half centuries a simple God-fearing way of life which our forebearers
have handed down to us and which we must pass on untarnished to posterity.”44
The only proper body to consider confederation was an elected Newfoundland
parliament, and The Monitor noted that
a
referendum may very often bring about the results desired by the promoters of
it and may not actually represent the real view of the voter. This notorious
fact has been highlighted too often in recent years for us to accept a
referendum as being a truly worthwhile test of public opinion.45
The
next month The Monitor warned that Confederation was irrevocable, and
that “a great deal of the information upon which the so-called ‘terms’ are
based is at best well-informed guess-work, and the danger of a hasty decision
becomes apparent.”46
In January 1948, Convention member Michael
Harrington charged that the proposed clause 19 would not protect the rights of
denominations to their education systems any more than the guarantees given
Manitoba Schools when faced by the contrary intentions of that province’s
government in1890. 47
Smallwood replied that the Manitoba Schools Question taught the Government of
Canada not to meddle in education, and that as a result, they would not touch
it.48 He then explicitly stated
that if, under confederation, a denomination wished to grieve its treatment
over education rights,
They
would go to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland, and there they would get
justice. The Supreme Court would have to carry out this clause, which
guarantees the rights of all the denominations. And if by chance, if by any
remote chance, our own Supreme Court failed to carry out this clause ... the
case could be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada itself. That, sir, is a
vast improvement over the Manitoba clause. ... I for one would not be so
foolish, so short-sighted as to advocate confederation if this education matter
had not been fixed up to the satisfaction of all concerned. ... I know my
country, sir, believe me, I know the deep and unshakable loyalty of our people
– all our people – to their
denominations. ... We have a school system which is a Newfoundland system, that
has grown up out of our Newfoundland ideals, our Newfoundland outlook on life.
It is a system that has grown up naturally, and I am the last person who would
upset it or allow it to be upset.49
In
reply, Cashin reminded the Convention that “if Canadians take charge of our
country” there was a threat that “in every probability we will have imposed on
us, even forced on us, the adoption of non-denominational schools.”50
But in his closing speech, Smallwood refuted Cashin’s claim and even promised
to drop his advocacy of confederation if it in any way threatened
denominational education.51 In
essence, Smallwood ensured that the Convention presented the education clause
to the churches and the Newfoundland public as a solemn promise to be ratified
and confirmed by Newfoundlanders if they chose the constitutional option of
confederation in the referenda. On a pragmatic political level, Smallwood had
to remove education as an issue of contention from the forthcoming referenda
debates, for it had the potential among all the issues to de-rail the prospect
of confederation if the religious denominations opposed it. In an attempt to
secure their acquiescence, the education clause was created to give iron-clad
guarantees to the religious denominations that the denominational education
system would continue in perpetuity.
At five
o’clock in the morning on 28 January 1948, a vigorous all-night debate
concluded on Smallwood’s motion to include confederation on the ballot paper.
The motion was defeated twenty-nine to sixteen,52
and the Convention recommended to the British government that the only options
to appear on the ballot paper should be a continuation of Commission of
Government, and a return to responsible government as it existed prior to 1934.53
But Smallwood was not defeated. He took to the airwaves, exhorting
Newfoundlanders to send him telegrams “demanding” that confederation appear on
the ballot. Fifty thousand names arrived. While this provided Smallwood with a
good campaign list of supporters, it was a theatrical gesture, for on 10
January the governor of Newfoundland had quietly travelled to Britain, and
secured Attlee’s approval for confederation on the ballot.54
The referendum campaign began, and with infusions of cash from C.D. Howe and
friends of the Liberal party of Canada,55
Smallwood’s campaign took off. It was an intensely personal campaign based on a
close knowledge of what people in the outports wanted, not on what the finer
points of constitutional law and procedure should be. Messages were kept
simple, the grab was always for the emotions, and a few basic themes were
always present. These included the personal financial benefits all would reap
from confederation, personal attacks on the anti-confederates, the claim of the
“fact” that “everyone” was voting for confederation, the “lies” which were
being spread about confederation by its opponents, and predictions that
religion would play a role in the vote.
In reply to the Convention proceedings, The
Monitor of February 1948 authoritatively stated that “the people of this
country should determine only one question at the present time, and that is
whether they desire to return to Responsible Government or to retain Commission
of Government.” If Newfoundlanders wished to enter into an “irrevocable” union
with Canada, this could be “best carried out, and should only be carried out,
after suitable negotiations between a full people’s Government of Newfoundland
and the Government of the Dominion of Canada.”56
Responsible government was presented as the only logical, fair and just choice,
and the proper position from which Newfoundland would be able to conduct equal
negotiations with Canada. To coincide with Catholic Press month and inform its
readers about the function of the Catholic press, The Monitor’s
circulation was increased for the next four months to 20,000 copies per issue,
to be distributed across the island to every Catholic home, free of charge.57
When
Britain announced on 11 March that confederation would be on the ballot, the
Confederates were jubilant, and responsible government advocates were outraged.
Where was British fair play and justice? There were to be three choices,
Commission of Government for another five years, responsible government as it
existed in 1933, and confederation with Canada. If there was no clear majority,
the option which received the fewest number of votes would be dropped from the
ballot and there would be a run-off referendum between the remaining two
options. At the end of March The Monitor responded to the British
announcement and claimed that
to
ask the people to go to the polls with such scanty information as they
presently possess is indefensible. We have not sufficient information on the
many financial and economic aspects of Confederation; and we have no
information on any of the important social and spiritual aspects of it. This
fact seems to have been lost sight of by the apologists for Confederation, and
it must be borne in mind that there may be far more serious ills in prospect
than purely economic ones.
The
Monitor then compared confederation to a marriage between a
couple, arranged by their parents without their consultation, and characterized
the confederates as “opportunists who would have Confederation now at any
price.”58 Young people were
reminded of their responsibility to vote, bearing in mind that the union the
confederates proposed should only be the result of negotiations between elected
parliaments of Newfoundland and Canada.59
The first referendum was held on 3 June
1948. Of the three options on the ballot paper, responsible government won, but
with a plurality. Commission of Government was chosen by 22,311 voters (14.32%),
64,066 chose confederation with Canada (41.13%), and 69,400 chose responsible
government (44.55%).60
Sixty-seven percent of voters on the Avalon Peninsula, composed of
predominantly Roman Catholic districts, voted for responsible government, with
25% supporting confederation and 8% supporting Commission of Government. In St.
John’s East and West, responsible government received 65.87% and 65.63% support,
Harbour Main-Bell Island saw 82.56% support, Ferryland gave the highest with
90.48% support, and Placentia-St. Mary’s gave 78.68% support. Off the Avalon
Peninsula, 54% voted for confederation, 26% voted for responsible government,
and 20% voted for Commission. Essentially, east coast Catholic Newfoundland had
voted against confederation while outport Protestant Newfoundland voted for it.
Commission of Government was dropped from the ballot. A run-off referendum was
scheduled for 22 July.
With these results in hand, the
Confederates lost no time. The first referendum left 22,000 pro-British Commission of Government votes up for grabs in
the second referendum. Smallwood had fifty thousand small posters made, bearing
the words “British Union and Confederation,” between which was a multicoloured
Union Jack. “The sudden appearance of thousands of these in house windows and
elsewhere,” Smallwood claimed, “was a violent reminder of the fact that we were
British, not American, and that Confederation would allow us to continue to
be British subjects.”61 The
confederates’ new platform was born.
The
confederates’ second campaign also tried to create the impression that Roman
Catholics had been instructed to vote for responsible government by Archbishop
Roche. On Sunday 6 June, the pro-responsible government tabloid The
Sunday Herald reported that for the first time in their
history, the Irish Christian Brothers, the Sisters of Mercy, and the
Presentation Sisters had gone to the polls.62
Confederate organizer Harold Horwood later claimed that this was “the most
serious mistake of the campaign,”63
for the division of votes by religion in the first referendum was “a split we
could use to great profit.”64 Horwood
quickly rushed around St. John’s, buying up all the Sunday Heralds he
could find.65 He circled the article
about the brothers and nuns. With Smallwood he worked up a list of Newfoundland
Orange lodges,66 of which there were
around 190,67 and sent the article to
every lodge in the country.68 Copies
of The Monitor’s editorials were also sent to the lodges.69
The confederate Greg Power (who ironically, was a cousin of Archbishop Roche)
later observed that Smallwood called a number of his prominent Protestant
supporters into his office, notably the Keans and Barbours, captains of vessels which called at ports
around the island. He threw a copy of The Monitor on the desk in front
of them, told them about the “Borgia from Branch,” “the Popish Plot,” and the
“Placentia Machiavelli,” Archbishop Roche. Playing on the RGL’s theme of “Home
Rule,” and the perennial myth of the monolithic Roman Catholic Church, he asked
them “What do you want? Rome Rule? Now go and tell your people.”70
The reaction in Orange Newfoundland was swift. Several versions of a general
letter to Newfoundland Orangemen were drafted, an exercise in which Smallwood
and Bradley had a hand, culminating in a letter calling on Orangemen “to use
every effort” to bring the Church’s activities “to nought.”71
The escalation of sectarianism reached its zenith when the letter quickly
became public. Peter Cashin gave it wide distribution in Catholic districts “as
evidence of Orange tactics.”72
On 22 July when the vote took place, the
results were anti-climactic. Horwood later explained his view of what happened
to the Church and the anti-confederates in the second referendum:
Every
right-thinking Protestant in the country went out and voted against them. In
the last ten days we fired off tons of gunpowder and distributed thousands of
dollars of Union Jacks. The baymen walked and crawled, and went in wheelchairs
to the polling booths, and gave us a 7,000 majority (78,000 to 71,000). The
Queen [sic] had been saved and the Pope sent back to his lair.73
When
the final votes were counted, 84.89% of eligible voters had voted.
Confederation received 78,323 votes, a bare majority of 6,989 votes over 71,334
votes for responsible government. The predominantly Roman Catholic districts of
St. John’s East and West, Harbour Main-Bell Island, Ferryland, and
Placentia-St. Mary’s voted for responsible government, along with the
predominantly Church of England districts of Harbour Grace and Port de Grave,
while the remaining districts, including the predominantly Roman Catholic
districts of St. George’s-Port au Port and Placentia West, voted for
confederation. Twillingate, which in the first referendum had voted 42% for
Commission of Government and 43% for confederation, voted 75% for confederation
in the second referendum, seemingly confirming the efficacy of the “British
Union”campaign. The Avalon Peninsula had chosen responsible government, but the
outports and the rest of Newfoundland had chosen confederation, and won.
At first, the government of Canada was
reluctant to accept such a narrow majority for confederation as a basis upon
which to proceed with union, fearing a backlash from the very substantial
minority of opponents. R.A. MacKay was sent to St. John’s to sound out leading
opinion on both sides of the question. He met with Smallwood, Bradley, and
other confederates, who advised him that Canada should accept the referendum
results. He also met informally with Bishops O’Reilly, O’Neill, and Archbishop
Flynn to see if confederation would be acceptable. They told MacKay of their
fears that under confederation, educational funding would be inadequate. But by
granting MacKay an audience, the bishops allowed him to put his own
interpretation on their views in his report back to Ottawa. He claimed that the
bishops “appreciated a mistake had been made by open opposition to
confederation,” and he claimed that “they would like a face-saving
arrangement.”74 It is unlikely that this
represented the views of the three bishops, but it certainly did not represent
Roche’s. Indeed, at the height of the sectarianism, and in its wake, Roche kept
official silence. The MacKay meeting formed an endpoint, after which the Church
essentially dropped its opposition to confederation, and contented itself with
guarantees to preserve its rights in education.
Having opened a Pandora’s Box of
sectarianism during the second referendum campaign, Smallwood now had to put the cover back on. He ensured that
denominational rights in education were guaranteed in Term 17 of a new draft
terms of union, negotiated between an appointed delegation from Newfoundland
(of which he was a member) and the Government of Canada during the fall of 1948
in Ottawa. Before the delegation left Newfoundland it held meetings seeking
advice on the existing 1947 terms, and submitted the education clause to the
Council of Education and to the denominational authorities. The Roman Catholic
executive officer, P.J. Hanley, corresponded with Roche and replied to the
second Ottawa delegation that the term was generally acceptable, providing that
a slight modification be made to include denominational colleges, and that
clarification be given on the method of allocating proportionate shares of
public funds for education.75 The
terms were signed by the Newfoundland and Canadian delegations in the Senate
Chamber on 11 December 1948.76 During
the debate on the final terms in the House of Commons in February 1949, Prime
Minister Laurent explained that “It was felt by the delegation from
Newfoundland that it would be more effective to have the clause concerning
guarantees drawn in this way so that the legislature would have complete
control over education but would not have jurisdiction to do things that would
impinge upon the rights of minorities. To do those things would be a denial of
jurisdiction.”77 In essence, St. Laurent
pledged that the Government of Canada accepted the Newfoundland delegation’s
belief, premise, and understanding that the religious denominations of
Newfoundland had rights and jurisdiction over education. St. Laurent assured
the House that the status quo would not be fixed for all time by Term 17
when it came to permitting the schools of different denominations to amalgamate
for a school district, and he reminded MPs that the Newfoundland legislature
could exercise its right to set up other schools, but that “they must not
discriminate against the denominational schools in the districts. Such was the
desire of the delegates from Newfoundland; and, ... the sanction was to be an
appeal to the courts, not an appeal to a political body.”78
Following St. Laurent’s remarks, the House agreed to the education section of
the Newfoundland bill,79 and on
17 February the House of Commons sent the bill to the Senate, where it received
third reading on 16 March 1949.80
A similar bill passed through the Westminster Parliament and was given Royal
Assent on 23 March 1949.81
At the end of the day, the victor was J.R.
Smallwood. He parlayed his referendum victory into the premiership of the new
Canadian province, and relished being Canada’s “Only Living Father of
Confederation.” Years later, in considering the role played by Archbishop
Roche, Smallwood and confederates such as Jack Pickersgill, Greg Power, and
Harold Horwood lost few opportunities to claim that Archbishop Roche was the
“real father of confederation.” While Roche’s indirect assent to the editorials
in The Monitor certainly played into the hands of the confederates,
there is no evidence, documentary or oral, to support any contention that Roche
preached in pulpits against confederation, or directly instructed Catholics to
vote against it. But Roche’s actions played into Smallwood’s hands, who used
him as a scapegoat, a straw man to be set up and then knocked over in a bid to
obtain political support in outport Protestant Newfoundland for confederation.
Roche was not as responsible for sectarianism in the confederation campaigns as
he was later portrayed by the confederates. Similarly, the education question
could have been a serious stumbling block to the confederate movement. If it
had not been handled effectively, it could have had the potential to unite
Catholics and Protestants against confederation in ways which Smallwood might
not have been able to control. Once a narrow majority voted for confederation
in the 22 July 1948 referendum, Smallwood then had to try to heal the rancour
and sectarian wounds in Newfoundland society, in part by guaranteeing the
continuation of denominational rights in education. This was done in the Terms
of Union, which formalized what had hitherto been customary and legal rights in
education into constitutional ones. As premier of the new province after 1
April 1949, Smallwood pledged himself to the preservation of those rights, and
maintained that position, and was held by the Churches to that position, until
he left office in January 1972.
1 6 William IV, c. 13, An Act for
the Encouragement of Education in this Colony.
The remainder of the grant was subdivided between the nine boards.
2 McCann, “Introduction” to an
issue on Education and Society, Newfoundland Studies, Vol. 11, No.2
(Fall 1995): 171-7. On the Irish system, see Donald H. Akenson, The Irish
Education Experiment: the National System of Education in the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1970), 107-22. Roman Catholic schools in Newfoundland
subsequently took little pattern from the Irish National System or its
Protestant ideological underpinnings.
3 F.W. Rowe, The Development of
Education in Newfoundland (Toronto, 1964), 63-4.
4
Archives of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. John’s, Archbishop Roche
Papers (hereafter AASJ, Roche Papers), Box 18, file: “1916-1930-Denominational
Schools,” Roche to priests of the Archdiocese, 5 September 1905.
5
Edward Patrick Roche, “Address to the Clergy of the Province given to the
annual priests' retreat in 1916,” (St. John’s, 1916), 4, 5, 9-10.
6 J.E. FitzGerald, “The Confederation of
Newfoundland with Canada, 1946-1949,” unpublished MA thesis, Memorial
University of Newfoundland, 1992, 44-5; Peter Neary, Ed., White Tie and
Decorations: Sir John and Lady Hope Simpson in Newfoundland, 1934-1936
(Toronto, 1996), 33.
7
Presentation Convent Archives, St. John’s, “Address of His Grace the
Archbishop, given at the close of the priests’ retreat, 1936,” 3.
8The
Monitor began in 1934 as the newsletter of St. Patrick’s
parish, St. John’s, but grew to become the archdiocesan newspaper.
9
Archives of the Diocese of St. George’s, Corner Brook, Newfoundland, Bishop
O’Reilly Papers, Coadjutor Archbishop Thomas J. Flynn of St. John’s to Bishop
M. O’Reilly, 11 October 1947.
10
J.R. Smallwood, “The Story of Confederation,” in J.R. Smallwood, Ed., Book
of Newfoundland, Vol. 3 (hereafter BNF) (St. John’s, 1967), 8.
11
Paul Bridle, Ed., Documents on Relations Between Canada and Newfoundland, Vol.
2, Part I (Ottawa, 1984) (hereafter Bridle, Documents), 243, J.S.
Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 May 1946.
12
J.K. Hiller and M.F. Harrington, The Newfoundland National Convention
1946-1948, Vol. 1 (hereafter Hiller and Harrington, National Convention)
(Montreal and Kingston, 1995), 577, 22 May 1947.
13
For example see Hiller and Harrington, National Convention, 678, speech
of Mr. Reddy, 7 November 1947.
14
FitzGerald, “Confederation,” 75.
15
Bridle, Documents, 414, Smallwood to St. Laurent, 21 March 1947.
16
Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), MG 30 Vol. 6, file: Semi-Official
and Personal Correspondence re: Newfoundland 1944-1950, R.A. MacKay to Paul
Bridle, 2 May 1947.
17
J.R. Smallwood, I Chose Canada (Toronto, 1973), 306.
18
This may have occurred because Higgins was not an intimate friend of Roche’s,
and Roche was “not an admirer” of Higgins (Robert S. Furlong to the author, 21
November 1991).
19
Bradley was “a vigorous Protestant” with “a strong antipathy to any possibility
of domination of Newfoundland by the Roman Catholic Church.” Smallwood, I
Chose Canada, 307.
21
Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 572.
23
Bridle, Documents, 543, minutes of meeting of 2 July 1947.
24
Ibid., 558, minutes of meeting of 7 July 1947.
25
Ibid., 618, minutes of meeting of 11 August 1947.
26
Frank O’Leary to the author, 12 May 1992, and William J. Ryan to the author, 13
September 1991. O’Leary’s father, F.M. O’Leary, was president of the RGL; Ryan
was an architect for the archdiocese and a friend of Roche’s.
27
The Monitor, July-August 1947; also see PAC, MG 27 III B20, Vol. 58, 26
British Government, file 1.
28
The Monitor, July-August 1947, 1.
29
Bridle, Documents, 669, undated note of W.L. Mackenzie King.
30
Ibid., 669, Memo of J.R. Baldwin, Assistant Secretary of Cabinet to Secretary of
State for External Affairs, 10 October 1947.
32
Ibid., 720, notes on St. Laurent’s meeting with the Press Gallery of the House
of Commons, 6 November 1947.
33
Ibid., 675-6, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17
October 1947.
34
Ibid., 676, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17 October
1947.
35
Ibid., 675-6, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17
October 1947.
36
Hiller and Harrington, National Convention, 892.
41
Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 309. Ki Su Kim, “J.R. Smallwood and the
Negotiation of a School System for Newfoundland, 1946-1948,” Newfoundland
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 1995): 60, claims that Smallwood
“conversed” with Archbishop Roche over the education question. I have found no
evidence to support the claim that such a meeting ever took place.
42
Robert S. Furlong to the author, 21 November 1991.
43
AASJ, Roche Papers, W. Gordon Warren to Father O’Mara, 17 December 1947.
44
The Monitor, November 1947, 1.
46
The Monitor, December 1947, 10.
47
Hiller and Harrington, National Convention, 1119.
49
Ibid. On 14 January 1948 Smallwood repeated his claim that the education clause
19 would guarantee the denominations’ rights (ibid, 1187).
50
Ibid., 1371. Cashin spoke on 23 January 1948.
52
Placing a sectarian emphasis on the Convention’s conclusion, J.S. Macdonald
noted to Ottawa that eleven of the thirteen Roman Catholics in the Convention
had voted against the inclusion of confederation on the ballot (see Bridle, Documents,
788, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 28 January
1948).
53
Hiller and Harrington, National Convention, 1455, Final Report of the
National Convention, 29 January 1948.
54
FitzGerald, “Confederation with Canada,” 103.
55
See Bridle, Documents, 910, J.R. Smallwood and F. Gordon Bradley to C.D.
Howe, 21 June 1948, asking for another $20,000 for the confederation campaign.
56
The Monitor, February 1948, 2.
60
Referenda statistics are taken from FitzGerald, “Confederation of Newfoundland
with Canada,” 315-17.
61
Smallwood, “The Story of Confederation,” BNF, 31.
62
The Sunday Herald, 6 June 1948, 3.
63
Harold Horwood, Joey (Toronto, 1989), 124.
64
Horwood, “How We Got Confederation,” The Evening Telegram, 28 March
1969, 37.
66
Horwood, “How We Got Confederation,” Evening Telegram, 28 March 1969,
37.
67
Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth, The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical
Geography of the Orange Order in Canada (Toronto, 1980), 83.
69Gregory
Power to the author, 27 January 1992; also see Centre for Newfoundland Studies
Archives, Memorial University Library, St. John’s, J.G. Higgins Papers,
3.01.028, Correspondence J.G. Higgins, 1949-1951, Free Protestant, Grand Bank,
to Higgins, 29 March 1950.
70
Gregory Power to the author, 27 January 1992.
71
For the full text of the Orange Letter see FitzGerald, “Confederation of
Newfoundland with Canada,” 318.
72
Donald Jamieson, “I Saw the Fight For Confederation,” BNF, 102.
73
Harold Horwood, “I’d Do it All Again,” in J.R. Thoms, Ed., Call Me Joey
(St. John’s, 1990), 62-3.
74
PAC, MG 30 E 159 Vol. 3, I.C.C.N.R., General Correspondence, Talk with
Coadjutor Archbishop Flynn and Bishop O’Reilly and Bishop O’Neill, 1-2.
75
AASJ, Roche Papers, Box 20, file: Educational Affairs 1948, Hanley to Roche, 3
September 1948; Bridle, Documents, 1082, memo of Hanley to G.A. Frecker,
22 September 1948.
76
Space does not permit the reproduction of the full text of the final Term 17,
but it may be found in Bridle, Documents 2/2, 1247.
77
Bridle, Documents 2/2, 1439, St. Laurent to the House of Commons, 8
February 1949.
81
Ibid., 1559, L.D. Wilgress, High Commissioner of Canada in Great Britain to
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 March 1949.